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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellee

Argument Priority 15

vs

Case No. 2003-0503

TERESA FOY,

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENTS
FOY'S "REQUEST FOR HEARING" WAS TIMELY FILED
ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
The Appellee CITY asserts [pp. 13-17 of APPELLEE'S
BRIEF] that the "request for hearing" was not timely.
The Appellee further acknowledges
page 14 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF

in Footnote #2 on

that

"for an unknown reason, both Foy's counsel and
the City' s counsel below adopted October 30th,
1997 as the due date for the request for
hearing."
Emphasis added. That is exactly correct! Such

i.e.

that the "request" was due on or before October 3 0th
was adopted by the CITY early in the litigation. See
CITY'S Memorandum

of Law

in Support

of Motion

for

Summary Judgment, 115, RECORD at 000035]. The CITY'S
position

that

the

"request"

document

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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l

WAS

TIMELY

RECEIVED

was never abandoned nor retreated from BY

THE CITY'S TRIAL COUNSEL during the entirety of the 5year litigation in the trial court. Indeed, as recently
as

the

final

13

January

hearing

the

hearing

obtained

the

"summary

at

2 0 03
which

judgment"

"summary
the

judgment"

CITY

the

finally

CITY'S

trial

counsel (Mr Lawrence) acknowledged during his arguments
before the Court:
Mr. LAWRENCE: . . • Ms. Foy now argues that a
letter which the City received which we
acknowledge receiving and we acknowledge
receiving it within the time period but it was
from a person named Kay Cooper, supposed a
tenant on the property.
See Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, 13 January
2003, page 2, line 8 through page 3, line 3. Emphasis
added. RECORD at 000732-000733.
Later during that same 13 January 2003

"summary

judgment hearing" Mr LAWRENCE stated:
Mr LAWRENCE: . . . I believe it was October
28th or 29th which was within the ten day
period for her to respond. Within that ten day
period the City received a letter signed by
someone named K. Cooper, the initial "K".
See Transcript of 13 January 2 0 03 Summary Judgment
Hearing, page 23, lines 8 through 19. Emphasis added.
RECORD at 000753 .
Principles of "estoppel" and "waiver" now PRECLUDE
the

CITY

from

counsel" now does

now

asserting

as

its

"appellate

that the "request for hearing" was

untimely. Similarly, the CITY should be estopped from
asserting the claimed untimeliness of the "request" by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reason of the CITY'S uncooperative resistance to any
and all "pre-trial discovery" on the issue.
To raise the "untimeliness" issue now
FIRST TIME

for THE

which the "footnoted" text from APPELLEE'S

BRIEF implicitly recognizes

when the case is now "on

appeal" goes clearly against long- standing precedent.
Arguments which have not been raised before the trial
court are not preserved and will be considered when
raised for the first time on appeal. Dansie vs Anderson
Lumber Company, 878 P. 2d 1155 (Utah Court of Appeals
1994) ; Wurst vs Department of Employment Security, 818
P. 2d 1036 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991) ; Olson vs ParkCraig-Olson, Incorporated, 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Court of
Appeals 1991).
B
THE "REQUEST FOR HEARING" WAS FILED TIMELY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 63-37-1, UTAH CODE
The

Plaintiff's

analysis,

calculations

and

conclusion (of untimeliness) are further inappropriate
and flawed when the provisions of Section 63-37-1, Utah
Code, are considered, thus:
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or
other document or any payment required or
authorized to be filed or made to the state of
Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof,
which is:
(1) Transmitted through the United
States mail, shall be deemed filed
or made and received by the state or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

political subdivision on the date
shown
by
the
post-office
cancellation mark stamped upon the
envelope
or
other
appropriate
wrapper containing it.
(2) . . . [provisions pertaining to
unreceived mailings]
Emphasis added. Section 63-37-1 was in effect in 1997,
at the times material hereto. [The provision has been
renumbered (since 2000) and is now found at Section 683-8.5, Utah Code, with slight text amendments.]
The original envelope
October 27th mailing

which would have shown the

was last in the custody of the

Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY. If this were then (6 years
ago) perceived to be such a dispositive issue upon
which the City would have based its action, one would
think the CITY would have preserved the envelope and
such would be "in evidence" before the Court. The CITY
didn't and the actual "postmarked" envelope isn't "in
evidence".]

In

evidence

is

the

"certificate

of

mailing", confirming the October 27th mailing date.
That

"certificate"

at

RECORD

00096

is

the

functional equivalent of the "postmark" on the envelope
and should be sufficient documentation of the timely
mailing. Thus, per the arithmetic calculations engaged
in by Plaintiff's appellate counsel, the October 27th
mailing

is TIMELY!

[As with all of the pre-trial

discovery, the CITY actively resisted in cooperating,
to disclose when the "request for hearing" might have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

actually been "received" by the CITY itself, not merely
the A.C.E. office. But such analysis is arguably "moot"
in any event, given the statutory mandate of Section
63-37-1, Utah Code

which does explain and legitimize

the position taken by the CITY'S trial attorney: that
the date of mailing and/or "receipt" of the "request
for hearing" was never an issue.] In accordance with
the provisions
mailing

is

of

timely

Section
and

63-37-1,

Plaintiff's

Utah

Code, the

newly-fabricated

assertions and conclusions (not presented to the trial
court) to the contrary are meritless.
II
THE GENERALIZED ENABLING LEGISLATION
OF SECTION 10-8-84, UTAH CODE
DOES NOT OVERCOME THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 10-11-2, UTAH CODE,
PERTAINING TO MUNICIPAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
INVOLVING "WEEDY LOTS" AND SIMILAR VIOLATIONS
The Plaintiff-Appellant WEST VALLEY CITY argues
[pp. 18-21 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] that the generalized
enabling legislation of Section 10-8-84, Utah Code, and
the abolition of the so-called "Dillon's Rule" under
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the case of State
vs Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d 1116 (Utah Supreme Court 1980) ,
entitles

the

CITY

to

disregard

the

statutory

requirements of Section 10-11-2 et seq, Utah Code. Such
is patently in error!
That approach misreads both THE STATUTE (Section
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10-8-84) and the Hutchinson decision. It is readily
apparent

that

Section

10-8-84,

Utah

Code,

is

generalized legislation and is kind of a "catch-all
enabling legislation". Over the decades, Section 10-884

and its predecessor provisions

have been relied

upon to uphold municipal ordinances in the face of
challenge, particular "Dillon's Rule"-type challenges.
The fatal flaw of the CITY'S analysis is the simple
fact that Section 10-8-84 was worded thus:
They [cities, acting through their legislative
governing bodies] may pass all ordinances and
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant
to general law, necessary for . . .
Emphasis added. Thus, the question arises: is the West
Valley

City A.C.E.

program

(and

its

foundational

ordinance), in the "weedy lot" context, "repugnant to
law" when the A.C.E. provisions are so diametrically
opposed and antagonistic to provisions of state law
SPECIFICALLY GOVERNING this subject, namely, Section
10-11-1, Utah Code?
Furthermore, Appellee CITY misreads the operational
effect of the State vs Hutchinson decision. Without a
doubt, Hutchinson repealed the so-called

"Dillon's

Rule" [which, briefly stated, proved for a narrowlyconstrued,

presumptively-disfavored

judicial

interpretation against municipal exercise of implied
powers]. The issue here is not, per se, dealing with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Dillon's

Rule".

That

issue

has

been

decided:

correctly. The error the CITY makes is that Hutchinson,
and the announced demise of "Dillon's Rule", are NOT
intended and were NEVER intended as an

"open the

floodgates" liberalization that local governments could
adopt anything

they wanted! TO THE CONTRARY, the

Supreme Court in Hutchinson expressly recognized that
one of the appropriate reasons to then-abandon the
anachronistic "Dillon's Rule" (which was for the most
part a methodology of judicially-followed jurisprudence
rather

than

a

grant

of

legislative

"enabling

legislation") was the EXISTENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWERS

BY

LOCAL

GOVERNMENT.

This

concept

that

municipalities are still subject to the LIMITING EFFECT
of

state

statutes

is

made

absolutely

clear

in

Hutchinson, thus:
There are ample safeguards against any abuse
of power
at
the
local
level. Local
governments, as subdivisions of the State,
exercise those powers granted to them by the
State Legislature, and the exercise of a
delegated power is subject to the limitations
imposed by state statutes and state and
federal constitutions.
624 P.2d at 1121. Emphasis added. Citation to cases
omitted.
Thus, the CITY'S analysis fails on both issues:
Section 10-8-84 and all local government "rights"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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thereunder are subject to the "not repugnant to law"
LIMITATION. Furthermore, Hutchinson, by its express
reason,

similarly

RECOGNIZES

THERE ARE

LIMITATIONS

which are placed upon municipalities BY OTHER STATUTES.
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Harding vs Alpine City, 656 P.2d 985 (Utah Supreme
Court 1982) is illustrative and, arguably, dispositive.
In Harding the municipality had attempted to require,
by ordinance, the mandatory connection to the public
sanitary sewer line if the occupied
located

within

500

feet;

state

structure were

statute

authorized

municipalities to require the connection if within "300
feet". In holding the municipal ordinance invalid, the
Supreme

Court

provisions

of

noting
Section

the

"not

10-8-84

expressed within Hutchinson

repugnant

and

the

to

law"

limitations

correctly observed that

were the municipality's position to be accepted, the
"300 feet" LIMITATION

(of the enabling

legislation)

would have no meaning.
In this same context, if the CITY'S position
the

effect

that

Section

10-8-84

and/or

to

Hutchinson

supersede and override the provisions of Section 10-112 et seq---is accepted, then the EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTYSEVEN words of Sections 10-11-2 through 10-11-4 are
effectively WRITTEN "OUT" OF THE STATUTE!
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The City' s attempted justification of its ordinance
simply fails.
A
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING STATUTES
The foregoing situation

the interpretation and

application of two arguably conflicting statutes
invokes the long-standing, time-honored principle of
statutory construction:
IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF TWO
CONFLICTING STATUTES
OF WHICH ONE STATUTE IS
"GENERAL"
IN NATURE AND THE OTHER
IS
"SPECIFIC"---THE PROVISIONS OF THE "SPECIFIC"
STATUTE ARE CONTROLLING OVER THE PROVISIONS OF
THE "GENERALIZED" STATUTE. Osuala vs Aetna
Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah Supreme
Court 1980); Pan Energy vs Martin, 813 P.2d
1142 (Utah Supreme Court 1991); Perry vs
Pioneer Wholesale Supply, 681 P.2d 214 (Utah
Supreme Court 1984); Forbes vs St Mark's
Hospital, 754 P.2d 933 (Utah Supreme Court
1988) ; State ex rel Public Service Commission
vs Southern Pacific Company, 95 Utah 84, 79
P. 2d 25 (Utah Supreme Court 1938) ; and Millett
vs Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah
Supreme Court 1980) [" [W]here the operation of
two statutory provisions is in conflict, that
provision which is more specific in its
application will govern over that which is
more general." 609 P.2d at 936-936].
It is readily apparent that the foregoing principle
dictates that the interpretation and solution advanced
by Plaintiff

CITY cannot be sustained; rather, the

provisions of Section 10-11-2 et seq, are controlling
and the application of the CITY'S "administrative code
enforcement" ordinance in this case (i.e. "weedy lot",
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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deleterious objects, etc.) must fail.1
Section 10-8-84 certainly is "general": a "catchall" as-it-were of "enabling legislation" to authorize
municipalities "police powers", according to its terms.
The statute is "general". It utilizes and contains the
phrase "not repugnant to law": thus, by its own terms,
10-8-84

recognizes

there might

be

situations

and

applications which are controlled by other provisions
of "law" (constitutions, federal statutes, and/or other
state statutes). In essence, Section 10-8-84 recognizes
and affirmatively

"takes

a back

seat"

to and

deference of those other provisions "the law"

in

more

specific and/or more controlling of the situation!
The interpretation advanced by West Valley CITY
would have the Court IGNORE the "not repugnant to law"
LIMITATION contained within Section 10-8-84, Utah Code,
and would invite the Court to IGNORE and overlook the
500+ WORDS contained in Section 10-11-2 et seq. In this
context, the Utah Supreme Court has written:
"It is to be
express terms,
municipalities
"not repugnant

noted that 10-8-84, by its
limits the grant of power to
to pass ordinances, to those
to law."

Allgood vs Larsen, 545 P.2d at 531. Emphasis added.]

lr

The CITY'S "administrative code enforcement" ordinance also
applies to other situations (animal control, etc.). Those
situations are not impacted (or invalidated) by the conflict with
the provisions
of Section 10-11-2 et seq.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The MANDATORY verb "SHALL"

in describing the

CITY'S duties and responsibilities

is utilized in

Sections 10-11-2 through 10-11-5 TWENTY-ONE TIMES, in
a variety of contexts!. Obviously, the Legislature
"advisedly"
USAGE

selecting that term and REPEATING ITS

intended

the MANDATORY

PERFORMANCE

OF THE

STATED OBLIGATION. [This must be contrasted with the
one-time usage of the permissive "may" (in the context
of adoption of ordinances, etc.) in Section 10-8-84.]
The CITY points out

correctly

that Section 10-

11-1 utilizes the verb "may" (appoint inspectors). This
is correct. Had the Legislature utilized the term
"shall" (appoint inspectors), that result would have
violated the Utah Constitution. See State ex rel Wright
vs Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 Pac. 1061 (1901)

[state

statute mandating appointment of county fruit tree
inspectors violated Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution (providing for local control of municipal
budgets and finances)]. But IF the municipality is
going to interact with the propertyowner
up your yard"
MANNER

i.e. "clean

then the municipality MUST ACT IN THE

DESIGNATED

BY THE

LEGISLATURE

in statute:

namely, by the procedures established in Section 10-112 et seq. West Valley City's approach
that "we're going to do it our own way"

to the effect
contravenes

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the STATUTE: BOTH IN ORDINANCE and in result! The
CITY'S argument that the A.C.E. program is simply "an
alternative means of accomplishing the same result" [p.
21 of APPELLEE'S BRIEF] doesn't work!
The

instant

judicial

decision

affirming

that

invalid result and affirming that invalid ordinance
must be clearly reversed!
•B

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ADOPTED IN
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE CONTRAVENTION
TO STATE STATUTE ARE INVALID
City ordinances not adopted in compliance with
statutory procedural requirements are invalid and void
ab initio. Call vs West Jordan City, 727 P. 2d 180 (Utah
Supreme Court 1986) ["Failure to strictly follow the
statutory

requirements

in

enacting

the

ordinance

renders it invalid . . . and void ab initio." 727 P.2d
at 182-183 . ]
County governments have also been subjected to this
result. Melville vs Salt Lake County, 536 P. 2d 133
(Utah Supreme Court 1975)

[county zoning ordinance

invalid because of county's failure to follow statutory
requirements of notice and publication].
See also Toone vs Weber County, 2002 Ut App 103,
57 P. 3d 1079

(Utah Supreme Court

2002)

[county's

purported sale of real estate not in compliance with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

statutory procedures invalidated and set aside].
Local governments are without authority to pass any
ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with, state
statutory law.

Salt Lake City vs Allred, 20 Utah 2d

298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968) . City ordinance prescribing a
greater penalty for trespass than was provided for in
the state criminal code is invalid. See Allgood vs
Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976) [holding "Salt Lake
City seeks to exceed the public policy declared by the
legislature relating to a new class of offense.

It

does not have that power of amendment." 545 P. 2d at
532.] In the instant case, Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY
seeks to impose upon Defendant FOY, for her
lot", an administratively-assessed

"weedy

"fine" of ALMOST

SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS, from a situation in which the
City incurred essentially no clean-up costs. Under the
provisions of Section 10-11-2, Utah Code, the City's
recovery would be limited to recovery of its actual
costs in the clean-up! Thus, per Allgood, the City's
attempt to have a higher
statute for the

"penalty" than allowed by

"weedy lot" invalidates

the A.C.E.

ordinance. See also Smith vs Hyde, 97 Utah 280, 92 P. 2d
1098 (1939) [municipal ordinance invalid due to penalty
in excess of that allowed by state statute].
The CITY's A.C.E. ordinance program

in the "weedy

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lot"

context

being

in

conflict

with

overriding

statute must simply fail!
Ill
THE CITY'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
PROVISIONS OF ITS ORDINANCES GRANTING TO
DEFENDANT FOY THE "RIGHT" TO A HEARING
IS CONTROLLING MORESO THAN THE "AGENCY" ISSUE
The CITY'S Brief argues
incumbent

upon

[pp. 11-13] that it was

the Defendant

FOY

to establish

"apparent authority" of her "agent(s)"

e.g. "Renter

K Cooper and/or former husband Jim Decker"
to the CITY the

the

in sending

"request for hearing" letter. This

disingenuous and "intellectually dishonest" argument
cannot honored
basis

for

as the District Court did

entry

of

the

summary

judgment

as the
against

Defendant FOY.
The District Court in its "Memorandum Decision"
acknowledged

the

factual

disputes

inherent

in

an

"agency" context, but nevertheless went on to rule
against Defendant FOY. On this narrow issue, the CITY
did

not

submit

one

support its claims
contradict

Ms

shred

of

"sworn

testimony"

to

(i.e. no "agency"), let alone to

FOY's

assertions

[See DEPOSITION

OF

TERESA FOY, page 6. RECORD at 00579, and AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES DECKER, RECORD at 000091-000095] that Jim Decker
was her "agent" and that Decker mailed the "request: for
hearing"

document

to the CITY, for the purpose of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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obtaining the "hearing"!
Against that backdrop (of the CITY'S failure to
submit

even

one

shred

of

sworn

evidence

to

the

contrary) is coupled the very "request for hearing"
document itself, against the generalized framework of
the CITY'S own ordinance, thus:
1.

The

"request

for

hearing"

document

doesn't just "fall unexpectedly out of the
sky", but rather is sent to the exact office
to which the CITY'S "notice of violation"
directs the mailing.
2.

The "request for hearing" document is

received by the CITY in a timely manner:
within the "ten-day period" established by the
"notice of violation"

sent to Ms FOY in

southern Utah. The "request" wasn't "early"
nor

was

it

expectedly

"late"; the

"request" was

"right on time"! [Absent some

kind of "authorization" from Defendant FOY,
the factual arrival of the "request" cannot be
construed to be mere coincidence or surprise
to the CITY or its personnel.]
3.

The

"request

for

hearing"

CORRECTLY

REFERS to the West Valley City A.C.E. "case
file number" [i.e. 97-5215], and ties that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case

number

to

the

property

address

in

question. [Again, who else but an "authorized
agent"

in apparent contact with Ms FOY in

southern Utah

would have coincidentally been

privy to that information, particularly within
a very narrow time-frame?]
4.

The

"request

for

hearing"

CORRECTLY

REFERS to Ms FOY's then-current residence in
southern Utah
5.

as so known by CITY personnel.

The "request for hearing" document was

"filed"

in the City's

case

file

for the

"Teresa Foy case".
6.

The CITY, in response thereto, initially

scheduled the hearing on the "Foy case". See
JAMES DECKER AFFIDAVIT, %1, RECORD at 000093.
7.

The CITY "switched" the hearings. [See

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER,

^7; RECORD at

00093.] The CITY has acknowledged
hearing WAS HELD

that a

see CITY'S Memorandum of

Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 2, HH9-14. RECORD at 000035-000036. This
statement

that

a

hearing

was

held,

is

mistaken and disingenuous on the CITY'S part.
The hearing that was held concerned "the Jim
Decker case", which just a few days earlier
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had been "opened". [At this early stage in the
litigation, the CITY and its attorney hadn't
really solidified its position, even though
the

City's

MEMORANDUM

situation

as

MEMORANDUM

does

propertyowner

characterizes

"undisputed
correctly

was Defendant

facts".
note

that

the
The
the

FOY, per the

administrative hearing officer's findings. But
the

"hearing

because

the

officer"

was

propertyowner

simply

wrong,

was

Lancer,

Incorporated

a fact eventually recognized

and

by

accepted

the

CITY

later

in

the

litigation.]
Against these sworn statements, the CITY provided NO
SWORN EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL. Those "facts" (and the
inferences therefrom) must be measured against the
City's own ordinance, thus:
1.

The CITY'S ordinance (and the "notice of

violation") document clearly state
times

numerous

that the opportunity for the "hearing"

is a "right".
2.

The

CITY'S

ordinance

utilizes

the

mandatory term "shall" in the context that
when the Director receives the "request for
hearing", the Director shall schedule the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hearing. There is NO REQUIREMENT that the
"request" be signed. There is NO REQUIREMENT
as

to

any

particular

"format"

for

the

"request", except that it be in writing. Thus,
although

the

"Renter

K Cooper"

origin

although arguably unexplained at first blush--might be simply ignored, the "bottom line" to
the document simply CANNOT BE IGNORED: to the
effect THAT A HEARING WAS REQUESTED!
3.

The CITY'S ordinance expressly makes an

"agent"

or

"lessee"

[see

"definition"

of

"person", WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(r)]
and "tenant", "person with a Legal Interest in
real property", and "person in possession of
real property" to be a "Responsible Person"
tenant"

[see

"definition"

of

"responsible

person", WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(u)].
Thus, facially, the "request for hearing" from
"Renter K Cooper" complied with the ordinance!
The

CITY'S

staff

had

no

discretion

to

disregard it.
4.

Furthermore,

because

the

CITY'S

own

ordinance [WVC Municipal Code, §10-1-110(u),
pertaining to "responsible person"] authorized
the CITY

ostensibly on the basis of evidence
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to be derived within the "hearing" context
to "determine" WHO MIGHT BE a "responsible
person",

as that person

"responsible

for

causing or maintaining [the] violation", it
was expected
miles

away

violations

certainly by FOY hundreds of
and

having

no

part

in

the

that those persons "responsible"

for the claimed "violations" should be able to
request a "hearing".
5.

Lastly, the CITY

somewhat at odds with

its own pleading [see ^3 of the Complaint,
RECORD at 000002] alleging that Defendant FOY
is the owner of the 0.15-acre parcel (which
she was)

has, within the course of the

litigation, adopted the position that she is
also PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FINANCIALLY

for

those violations committed or present upon the
Lancer, Incorporated parcel! [The CITY ought
not

be

allowed

to

"split

hairs"

on

the

"agency" issue (vis-a-vis the "request for
hearing") and then paint Ms FOY's personal
liability "with a broad brush" as concerning
the

"corporate parcel's" violations!]

CITY'S

position

ignores

the

fact

The

that a

corporation can act only through its agents
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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AND

that

the

"lion's

share"

of

the

"violations" were NOT LOCATED on the "Foy
parcel",

but

were

rather

located

on

the

"Lancer, Incorporated parcel" to the south!
It is "black-letter law" [Rule 56(c) and countless
appellate court decisions] that summary judgment is
proper in cases where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. In cases where the facts
are in dispute, summary judgment is only granted when,
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment, the moving party is
entitled

to

judgment.

In

this

"summary

judgment"

context the Utah Supreme Court has observed that
"the facts are to be liberally construed in
favor of the parties opposing the motion, and
those parties are to be given the benefit of
all inferences which might reasonably be drawn
from the evidence."
Payne ex rel Payne vs Myers, 743 P. 2d 186 at 187-88
(Utah Supreme Court 1987). Emphasis added. See also
Clover vs Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah
Supreme Court 1991) and Owens vs Garfield, 784 P. 2d
1187 (Utah Supreme Court 1989).
Given the sworn statements of the Defendant before
the Court, "all inferences which might reasonably be
drawn" therefrom (Payne, supra), and the CITY'S own
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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LACK OF SWORN STATEMENTS, "summary judgment" against
Defendant FOY was most improper and must be reversed.
IV
THE "PETITION FOR REVIEW" JUDICIAL REMEDY
CLAIM IS INCORRECTLY APPEALED
On appeal, the CITY has raised
APPELLEE'S BRIEF]

FOR THE FIRST TIME

[pp. 16-18 of
an issue not

presented to and considered by the District Court2:
that

FOY

"failed

to

exhaust

her

administrative

remedies" in failing to file a timely "petition for

2

The District Court' s ruling based upon FOY' s " failure
to exhaust her administrative remedies", focused upon the
Court's analysis that FOY had failed to "request" the
"hearing". The District Court, in reasoning and justifying the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee CITY and
against Appellant FOY, reasoned that FOY had "failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies". The apparent factual
basis for that ruling was the District Court's incorrectlyconcluded conclusion that FOY "personally" had not requested
the hearing.
In concluding that Defendant FOY had "failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies", the District Court applied
statutory standards found in the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act [hereinafter "UAPA"], codified at 63-46b-l et
seq, Utah Code. The provisions of the UAPA generally, and
specifically the "exhaustion" requirements cited by the
District Court, are INAPPLICABLE to the instant situation, by
reason of a careful reading of the "definition" provisions of
the UAPA [Section 63-46b-2, Utah Code], thus:
(1) As used in this chapter:
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission,
... of this state . . . but does not mean ...
any political subdivision of the state...
Emphasis added. Thus, the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY
as a
political subdivision of the State of Utah
is not an
"agency"
[for UAPA purposes] and the "exhaustion of
administrative remedies" provisions of 63-46b-14, Utah Code,
as expressly relied upon by the District Court are erroneous.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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review" with the District Court immediately following
conclusion of the A.C.E. administrative proceeding. The
CITY asserts FOY is precluded now from asserting any
"defenses" or claims within this judicial proceeding
filed by the CITY.
Much

like

the

"request for hearing"
in any event

claimed

"untimeliness"

of

the

as shown above to be "timely"

the City's "exhaustion of administrative

remedies" argument HEREIN RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME "ON
APPEAL", must be neither countenanced nor recognized.
This argument

that FOY didn't file a "petition for

review" in the District Court

was NOT presented to

the District Court and the District Court did not rule
thereon! Accordingly, such is improperly raised for the
first time on appeal. See Dansie, supra; Wurst, supra;
and Olson, supra. See also Broberg vs Hess, 782 P.2d
198

(Utah

Court

of

Appeals)

[where

there

is no

indication in the record on appeal that the trial court
reached or ruled on an issue, the Court of Appeals will
not undertake to consider the issue on appeal].
There is also an unconscionable unfairness with the
City's position. First, that position

ostensibly

arising from the provisions of its own ordinances,
which in the "weedy lot" context may be invalid as
being "repugnant to law" (i.e. Section 10-11-2 et seq) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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--ought not defeat and restrict consideration of FOY's
pleaded

"defenses". Section 10-11-2 et seq wouldn't

have made FOY incur the expense of filing a "district
court

case"

to

challenge

the

municipality's

determinations (as to clean-up costs, etc.) . Secondly,
the CITY'S own ordinances characterize the "petition
for review" by utilizing the permissive term "may".
Thirdly,

those

"petition

for

same
review"

ordinances
as

a

characterize

"judicial"

remedy,

the
as

contrasted with an "administrative" remedy. So, in the
"common

law"

jurisprudence

as

herein

applied,

she

hasn't failed to exhaust her "administrative" remedies
by failing to seek the "judicial" remedy. [The CITY
not Ms FOY

selected the terms it utilized in the

Ordinance.] There is unfairness and lack of "mutuality"
in the result

if the CITY'S position is accepted

to

the effect that FOY must appeal to the District Court
(through the "petition for review"), or else she loses
ALL HER RIGHTS.3 It is patently unfair to take the
position

as the CITY does

that FOY loses all her

opportunity to "defend" against THE JUDICIAL ACTION THE
CITY HAS NOW FILED AGAINST HER! Defendant FOY ought to
3

It is speculative, for sure, but one must wonder what the
CITY'S position would be within the "petition for review"
proceeding, had such been actually filed with the District Court.
Would the CITY be asserting the Defendant
as petitioner
couldn't raise the issues she has herein raised? If such wouldn't
be the CITY'SDigitized
position,
then what is the problem?
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be able to raise and litigate all the "defenses" she
has pleaded. [The District Court's grant of summary
judgment essentially (implicitly) ruled, as a matter of
law, that all those "defenses" were invalid and/or
ineffective. ]
The

CITY,

by

ordinance,

cannot

ESTABLISH

OR

RESTRICT THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT by the
provisions of the municipality's own ordinance! In
similar vein, the CITY cannot, through such ordinance,
side-step

and

circumvent

bootstrapping" setting

in

an

almost

"reverse

appropriate "judicial review"

of the very ordinances Defendant FOY seeks to have
declared invalid. If the CITY'S A.C.E. ordinance is
invalid

for example, as contradicting Section 10-11-

2, Utah Code

then the "exhaustion" requirements of

that same ordinance are similarly invalid and of no
effect. The CITY cannot "short-circuit" the process
through these claims and thus deny the Defendant the
opportunity to defend. In the face of those "defenses",
the CITY was not "entitled to judgment as a matter of
law" and summary judgment should NOT have been entered.
CONCLUSION
The District

Court

erred

in granting

summary

judgment against Defendant FOY, when so many of the
necessary

"facts"

were

"in

genuine

dispute":
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particularly, when a "request for hearing" had been
TIMELY FILED. The "agency" arguments advanced by the
City distracted the District Court from the material
analysis of the problem: the mandatory provisions of
the CITY'S own ordinances

(requiring a hearing be

scheduled AND HELD).
The

CITY'S

"code

enforcement

procedures"

(ostensibly authorizing "administrative fines") when in
fact the CITY incurred no actual expenses in the cleanup of the parcel(s), contradicts the detailed and
binding guidelines and requirements of Section 10-11-1
et seq, Utah Code, properly pleaded as a "defense" and
which should have been overcome before summary judgment
could have been entered.
The judgment of the District Court should be and
must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of February,
2004.
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I certify that I caused TWO COPIES of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, first-class
postage prepaid, to Mr J Richard Catten, Attorney at
Law, Office of the West Valley City Attorney, West
Valley City Corporation, 3600 South Constitution
Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119, this 17th day
of February, 2004.
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